A United Nations employee working on a coca-substitution project in Colombia was kidnapped earlier this week by a dissident FARC faction, just prior to a UN Security Council visit to show support for the country’s peace deal.
The challenges of setting up FARC ‘centralisation zones’, which will host guerrillas while they surrender their arms and transition to civilian life, illustrate the dilemma facing President Juan Manuel Santos and his government. Implementing agreements that change the course of Colombia’s past requires confronting both the root causes of the conflict and its nefarious consequences.
A FARC centralisation zone in Caldono, Colombia. Jaime Saldarriaga/Reuters
It’s time to get back to work
According to the peace accords, more than 20 camps would be established across Colombia under the supervision of the United Nations and with security provided by Colombian armed forces. According to the accords, over 20 camps will be set up across Colombia, with the United Nations overseeing and providing security.
These camps are a symbol of the government’s determination to protect the lives and integrity of former rebels. These camps also demonstrate, and this is crucial, the Colombian government’s assertion of its monopoly on violence in the nation.
The government had to implement the security protocols for this process to be operationalised within 180 days after the treaty was ratified. However, UN experts recently announced that centralisation zones will not be ready until the end of March. They questioned whether the deadline could actually be met.
The FARC has questioned Santos over these delays. These claims, however, ignore the fact the government is trying to implement the agreements. It’s just having a hard time doing so in areas where other armed groups, such as drug traffickers, are still active.
The government is working to mobilize resources, actors and plans. However, it is not clear whether state institutions are able to fulfill their mandate.
The situation is made worse by the fact that some politicians have been campaigning against the FARC agreement , including former president Alvaro Uribe. The conservative candidates for the 2018 presidential elections have adopted the slogan “Repeal & renegotiate”. However, they are oddly silent on the assassination of activists.
This uncertainty could lead to dissidents in the FARC claiming that the government is not committed to peace.
Local weaknesses
The challenges of implementing the accords reflect the vast differences in the capacity between national and local institutions.
Logically, the centralization camps will be located in areas that the FARC previously influenced. Local government is weak in these areas because the FARC once controlled them.
Santos’ administration faces the reality of working with ineffective, -corrupt, slow, and easily captured by non-state or marginal actors. The problem of weak local governments was predictable and informed peace negotiations. However, the gap in capacity between the national government’s institutions and those of the provinces is greater than expected.
It is important to understand the difference between concepts such as government and state. The Santos Administration is the executive branch of the government.
Colombia is in an uncomfortable situation. It has a government that wants to implement peace agreements, but it also has a state which is either too weak or peripheral to carry out orders.
For decades, in some areas of the country, well-armed and well-organized FARC has been stronger than the government. Jose Gomez/Reuters
FARC leaders who blame the government for slowing down the peace process ignore the structural problems that they created. Weak state institutions are not only responsible for delays but also for the emergence of guerrilla groups such as the FARC. They have further weakened these groups.
Bogota’s high level of legislative and executive power, which is home to an ambitious national government that can embark on a project as ambitious as peace, stands in stark contrast to provincial institutions. Many governments in remote areas have failed to provide essential services (education, water, and roads) to their people, making them vulnerable to being controlled, replaced, or influenced.
Since the early 1900s, armed groups have surpassed the capabilities of states in remote regions (the secession between 1899-1902 of Panama from Colombia is a good example ).
Since the mid-20th century, successive administrations have attempted, but failed, to reunify the state institutions and restore the monopoly on violence throughout Colombia. The FARC peace accord, as well as any future agreements with other groups currently in negotiations, will offer this opportunity and embody the challenge.
This is the great contradiction of Colombia: Internal conflict has created a weak state. Today, as Colombia seeks to allow its most powerful guerilla to lay down their arms, this institutional weakness is an enormous obstacle. If Colombia is able to set up FARC centralisation camp, it may find peace despite itself.